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ROBERT S. MARX LECfURE
THE CONFIRMATION MESS, CONTINUED
Stephen L. Carter *
The subject of this lecture is "the confirmation mess"-a topic on
which I have written before. In the past, like other academic stu-
dents of the confirmation process, I have paid attention principally
to battles over nominees to the federal judiciary, especially the
Supreme Court. I have criticized the trend toward screening poten-
tial Justices based on their likely votes. Although I recognize that
many disagree, on the left and right alike, I have argued that this
tendency poses a threat to the constitutional ideal of judicial inde-
pendence and, if it becomes our consistent habit, vitiates the argu-
ments in support of judicial review. 1
Recent events have suggested the possibility that more and more
cabinet nominees might find themselves subjected to a degree of
scrutiny that heretofore, rightly or wrongly, has been deemed the
due only of candidates for the Supreme Court. Just two days after
his inauguration, President Bill Clinton withdrew his nomination of
Zoe Baird to serve as the United States Attorney General; his staff
then floated the name of federal judge Kimba Wood, which was just
as quickly unfloated. In both cases, problems surrounding the em-
ployment of a nanny were said to "disqualify" the nominee.
His third nominee, Janet Reno, was dogged by scurrilous rumors
that spread across Capitol Hill-and the newspapers-like wildfire,
repeated without any verification. The rumors turned out to be
false, but nobody apologized for printing them: their news value, it
seems, and hence the public's fabled right to know, did not turn on
whether they were true. A lobbyist for a Beltway interest group ad-
mitted spreading them and was dismissed; Reno was quickly and
properly confirmed.
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Other cabinet nominees (although, as will be seen, not many)
have also found themselves "disqualified" over the years. Two of
the more recent are John Tower, whose nomination by President
George Bush for Secretary of Defense collapsed under the weight of
charges of womanizing and excessive drinking; and Theodore'Sor-
ensen, whose nomination by President Jimmy Carter for Director of
Central Intelligence was withdrawn in the wake of assertions that he
lacked experience, was a pacifist, and had used secret documents in
writing about the Kennedy administration.
It is not my purpose in this lecture to rehash the charges and
countercharges that aros~ in any of these cases; nor is the lecture a
brief on behalf of any particular nominee.2 Rather, it is my aim to
use the controversy surrounding the Baird nomination, in tandem
with some other past battles over judicial nominations, to illuminate
the notion that an aspect of an individual's past might disqualify her
from public service, or, at least, public service requiring Senate con-
firmation. In particular, I shall argue that we must regain the ability
to balance the wrongs that a candidate might have done against the
strengths that she might bring to public service-::-an ability that has
tended to atrophy in an age in which we allow the mass media to
play the role of guardians of public morality.
The trend toward searching for disqualifying factors means that
we have become less interested in how well a nominee for a cabinet
position or the Court will do the job than in whether the individual
deserves it, as though the vital question is whether the candidate
should get the chance to add the, post to her resume, which simply
reinforces public cynicism about motives for entering public life.
We have come to treat public service as a reward rather than a call-
ing, which takes us down a rather dangerous road, for it becomes
impossible to bring any sense of proportionality to bear on the eval-
uation of potential officials.
Further, the search for disqualifying factors potentially leads to a
rather freewheeling investigation-largely media-led-into' the
backgrounds of nominees. The possibility of keeping one's private
life private becomes virtually nil, as only the tissue-thin wall of news
judgment stands between the nominee and disclosure (and condem-
nation) of whatever the candidate might least wish to discuss. This
might seem just fine, until you take the time to consider (as I shall
below) some of the things that might be disclosed in later cases.
2. I am constrained to add that I know and much admire Zoe Baird, who would, I
believe, have made a fine Attorney General.
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To be sure, there are some facts about an individual's background
that should be disqualifying, but I fear that recent history has shown
us to be a bit mixed up about what they are; consequently, I close
the lecture by suggesting which purported disqualifications should
be easily curable, which should be curable with difficulty, and which
should never be curable at all.
I. THE DISQ.UALIFICATION GAME
Perhaps it is only our imagination that suggests, in this constantly
televised age, that today's confirmation hearings are rougher than
those of the past. Perhaps there has been no era in our history when
'trashing the candidate-"digging up dirt"-was anything other than
the order of the day. Yet it is difficult to imagine that those who
wrote and ratified the Constitution, when they designed the balance
of power between the executive and legislative branches in the ap-
pointment process, envisioned quite the mess into which we have
worked ourselves.
Our sense of reasonable proportion has gone the way of all other
accoutrements of public moral dialogue. We are capable in public
life of moralizing, but not of morality. Our puritanical fervor burns
brightly at our oddly chosen moments of national condemnation: in
a nation in which public officials have been complicit and sometimes
willful in the collapse of the inner-city schools that educate millions
of poor children, we are incensed because a potential Attorney Gen-
eral failed to please all elements of our labyrinthian federal bureau-
cracy in her employment of household help. That Zoe Baird did
wrong is undeniable; where that wrong ranks on the scale of na-
tional scandal, however, is something we have been strangely unable
to fathom.
We have been caught up in "baby boomdom"; in an era when the
quest for the perfect resume seems entirely adequate as the defini-
tion of a life well-lived, we have fallen into the trap of presuming
that public service is simply another stop along the route. When we
consider who should serve the nation in our governmental appara-
tus, we treat the inquiry as one involving moral desert: has the indi-
vidual earned a place, or has the individual exhibited some behavior
that is disqualifying? These are the questions that we ask nowadays
and, for cabinet nominees, they seem to be the only ones that mat-
ter. For better or worse, we ask Supreme Court nominees for their
views on a variety of substantive legal questions; but cabinet nomi-
nations have long been treated with a deference that makes search-
ing policy inquiries seem to be in bad taste. Thus, we may ask the
Commerce Secretary-designate about his position on the best
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scheme for reducing the trade deficit with Japan, and we might quiz
the Attorney General-designate about her views on protecting abor-
tion clinics from over-zealous protesters, but the Senate rarely votes
on such issues. The Senate votes the nation's moral fervor instead;
we hold referenda on how bad a person the nominee is.
In this sense, our modern approach to the confirmation process is
much like the ban on service by gay and lesbian citizens in the mili-
tary. The military ban (which, unfortunately, is still in force) is cate-
gorical. It leaves no space for balance. We do not ask what qualities
gay or lesbian soldiers, sailors, or pilots might bring to military ser-
vice, or whether they might serve the nation with honor. We ask,
rather, whether they have engaged in conduct-sexual love within,
rather than across, gender lines-that offends some people's moral-
ity.3 And that is all we wish to know: once we have found that "dis-
qualification," our inquiry ends.
The Presidents who nominate feed the disqualification game, with
their disingenuous but perfectly understandable insistence that
every nominee for every position is the best, or among the best,
qualified. (Frequently, they use these very words.) The implication
of such rhetoric is that a concrete set of requirements for the job-
the paper qualifications-somewhere exists. Many candidates have
been screened, the President is implying, and my nominee fits best. It is as
though the nominee's resume is the principal, perhaps the only,jus-
tification for the nomination and, thus, for confirmation and for the
appointment itself. If this bit of presidential puffery is disproved,
then one might literally say that the formerly qualified nominee has
now been disqualified.
But the approach that divides nominees into only two categories,
the deserving and the disqualified, is bad for our government. The
scrutiny we now require before allowing willing professionals to be-
come public servants is likely to weaken, not strengthen, our institu-
tions. There is much to be said for keeping government free of the
taint of scandal, but not for creating scandals to keep our govern-
ment free of people we do not like. Moreover, in our rush to treat
virtually any bit of wrongdoing as proof of moral unfitness, we have
lost the sense of balance that is vital to a vibrant, functioning de-
3. Lest the reader protest that homosexuals have done nothing wrong, whereas
such cabinet nominees as Zoe Baird have broken the law, I would remind that there are
places-many-where sexual relations between adults of the same sex is illegal. These
laws are cruel. and the Supreme Court, in my judgment, erred in failing to rule them
unconstitutional in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), but that does not change
the fact that they are the laws. Most of the offenses charged against Zoe Baird (as will be
seen) also fall into the category of violation of cruel laws.
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mocracy-a sense perfectly captured in the words of our greatest
President, Abraham Lincoln, who said: "On principle I dislike an
oath which requires a man to swear he has done no wrong. It rejects
the Christian principle of forgiveness on terms of repentance. I
think it enough if a man does no wrong hereafter."4
When I say that the search for disqualifying factors is a bad thing,
I do not mean to suggest that nothing the search turns up should be
allowed to count. Facts, after all, are facts. (You can probably guess
that I am not a big fan of the "exclusionary rule" in criminal proce-
dure.) For example, supporters of Clarence Thomas have charged
that there was an open but despicable nationwide campaign to dig
up "dirt" on him, involving phone trees, burrowing researchers,
even a few advertisements. The notion of such a campaign-if it
existed at all-is repulsive, but that does not mean that what diligent
searching turned up should be discounted. Millions of Americans
(the majority in some recent surveys) believed Anita Hill's charges
of harassment.5 Some have argued that Hill's charges themselves
might not have been disqualifying, but one who believed them could
reasonably conclude that Thomas's denials, under oath, were by
themselves reason enough not to confirm.
Clarence Thomas, of course, was a Supreme Court nominee, and
we have come to expect bitter battles when seats on that tribunal
become vacant. Cabinet nominations, however, have traditionally
been handled by the Senate with kid gloves, at least until the last
two decades. As we shall see, until recently, the handling has been
so gentle as to make nomination to a cabinet post virtually tanta-
mount to appointment. The fate of the Baird nomination, as well as
some fascinating data to which we shall turn shortly, suggests a
much closer scrutiny of cabinet nominees as well. Probably, this is
as it should be; the tradition of strong deference to presidential cab-
inet choices was never as historically or constitutionally grounded
an idea as rhetoric about letting the President select "his own team"
made it sound. Senatorial confirmation was not designed by the
Founders to be used as a rubber stamp. On the contrary, the Foun-
ders understood what the Congress has only intermittently realized,
that the confirmation power was to be a check on the President's
freedom to staff the government and, hence, on his policies.
But if we are to play the disqualification game, we should at least
try to be sensible about it. Right now, the game proceeds in accord-
ance with no rules whatsoever. The brouhaha over the Baird nomi-
4. HAROLD M. HYMAN, To TRY MEN'S SOULS 188 (1960) (emphasis in original).
5. I also believed lhe charges wilhoUl reservalion. Anila Hill, a long-lime friend, is
as lrUlhful an individual as I know.
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nation shows the inconsistency of our moral indignation, which
strikes, cancer-like, almost randomly. Among Zoe Baird's recent
predecessors as nominees for Attorney General was one who was
accused of arranging jobs on the federal payroll for individuals to
whom he was financially indebted. The story scarcely stirred the in-
terest of the nation's press, to say nothing of the fury of the nation's
voters. Perhaps the story was not even true-Edwin Meese, the
nominee in question, certainly denied it-but it is nevertheless re-
markable that so little outrage greeted the allegations, if, as now
appears, the identity of one's nanny is a matter of national moment.
II. THE COURT: RECENT HISTORY
As I have already noted, cabinet nominees are not the only ones
who face the disqualification challenge. Supreme Court nominees
traditionally have endured close scrutiny. John Rutledge, nomi-
nated by President George Washington for ChiefJustice, was forced
to confront charges that he was mentally incompetent; charges,
many argue, that were smoke screens for political objections.
Whatever the truth of the charges, they did their damage: Rutledge
was not confirmed. (He subsequently attempted suicide.) In recent
years, although some have insisted that we should keep the battles
over judicial nominees in the arena of issues,6 the question of moral
fitness has often been very much a part of those inquiries. Given the
authority that we delegate to the courts, this is scarcely surprising.
But, like the screening of cabinet nominees, the examination of can-
didates for the Supreme Court sometimes gets out of hand. When it
does, the supporters of the nominee in question. always insist that
his or her reputation has been trashed-and sometimes, it is true.
This is hardly the place to write a history of the contentious bat-
tles that have marked the Supreme Court appointments process;
that work has been done, many times over. 7 What might be useful is
to draw a line to mark the beginning of the present era. Given the
6. Whether that is the proper plane is a question I have taken up elsewhere,
perhaps more often than is strictly necessary. See Stephen L. Carter, A Litmus Test for
Judges? It Demeans the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993, at A5 [hereinafter Carter. Litmus
Test]; Stephen L. Carter, The Candidate, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1993, at 29
[hereinafter Carter, The Candidate]; see also sources cited supra note I.
7. See, e.g., PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT: CLARENCE THOMAS, ROBERT BORK,
AND THE INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S NOMINATION BATTLES (1992);
WILLIAM H. REHNQ.UIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is (1987);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF JUSTICES
CAN CHANGE OUR LtvES (1985); CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY (1923); Paul Freund, Appointment ofJustices: Some Historical Perspectives,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1988).
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nation's racist history, it should be unsurprising that the tradition of
trashing Supreme Court nominees-of using any argument,
whether or not based in fact, to smear the reputation of a potential
Justice-began in earnest with the first black nominee, Thurgood
Marshall. To be sure, the fine tradition of vicious whispering cam-
paigns goes back at least as far as the nomination of the first Jewish
Justice, Louis Brandeis, in 1916 (which might simply be more evi-
dence of racism). And, in 1957, William Brennan, nominated by
President Dwight Eisenhower, faced allegations from Senator Jo-
seph McCarthy that he was soft on communism, evidently because
he had had the temerity to criticize the inquisitorial activities of
some congressional committees.s But only in 1967, when Marshall
was nominated by President LyndonJohnson, did the art of trashing
touch the pinnacle. Indeed, conservatives who believe what Robert
Bork or Clarence Thomas suffered was unprecedented in our his-
tory should stop wallowing in unnamed sources and take the time to
read the transcript of the Marshall hearings; where it was the right-
not the left-that spent the sUJ!lmer tossing mud.
I have written about Marshall's confirmation hearings in some de-
tail elsewhere and will not trouble to repeat that analysis here.9 Let
it suffice to say that everything from how he had written the briefs in
Brown v. Board ofEducation, to what books he cited in his opinions, to
what schools he selected for his children to attend became-for his
more intemperate critics-evidence of his lack of personal morality.
The actual ground for the opposition was politics-his opponents
were mainly segregationist- senators and their allies-but the smoke
screen, as so often, was character.'
Nowadays, trashing of this sort is almost expected, which. is why
everybody girds for it in advance. In the case of judges in general,
however, and Supreme Court Justices in particular, we also have an
additional "disqualifying'" factor-how we expect the nominee to
vote. We do not call the factor an anticipated vote; we dress it up
with such fancy names as "judicial philosophy"; but, at bottom, the
political concern is whether the nominee will vote in ways that will
make constituent groups happy. That this factor works in the same
way to derail otherwise "qu,alified" nominees is evidenced, for ex-
ample, by the comment of Bruce Ackerman-no fan of the Bork
8. See Hearings on the Nomination of William j. Brennan. Jr, Before the Senate Comm, all the
Judiciary. 85th Cong.. 1st Sess. 5-28 (l9'57).
9. See generally Carter. Confirmation Mess. Revisited, supra n'ote I.
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nomination-that Robert Bork came to the hearings with one of the
most impressive resumes of any candidate in this century.IO
The Bork hearings, indeed, are instructive for any number of rea-
sons. Bork, it will be recalled, was defeated by a vote of 58-42, by
far the largest plurality of votes ever cast against a nominee for the
Supreme Court. As virtually nobody challenged his resume or his
experience, the case against him rested on the claim that he was
disqualified.
And what were Bork's disqualifying sins?
The truth is, although I have made a small study of the Bork con-
firmation battle-in fact, I have written three law review articles
about itll-I am still at something of a loss to explain what, other
than his predicted votes, constituted the substance of the case
against him. Some of his opponents, resting on the plausible but
troubling principle that the notion that Bork would vote the wrong
way was reason enough to oppose him (just as it is plausible, but
troubling, for a President to suppose that the notion that Bork
would vote the right way is reason enough to support him), placed
their opposition on the ground that he would vote no when they
wanted a yes, and let it go at that. 12
His most bitter opponents, however, perhaps not satisfied thatju-
dicial philosophy alone would play in Peoria, took the evidence of
his likely votes and turned it into a series of moral flaws. As I read
the rhetoric of his opponents at the time, he wanted to sterilize wo-
men or force them into back-alley abortions, or both. He did not
believe that black people should sit at the same lunch counters as
white people. He thought the government should be in our bed-
rooms, figuring out whether we were using an illicit means of birth
control. I3 And, to top it off, he believed that the Congress had the
power to overturn Roe v. Wade by a simple statute.
10. Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1164
(1988) (citing Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 1987: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary , 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 701 (1987)).
II. See sources cited supra note I.
12. For some of the reasons that I consider this approach-by the Senate or the
President-to be flawed, see generally Carter, Confirmation Mess, supra note I; Carter,
Litmus Test, supra note 6.
13. Although this rhetoric was virtually everywhere, the best-known example is
Senator Edward Kennedy's floor speech on the day the nomination was announced. See
133 CONGo REC. 18,519 (1987) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). The point of the speech,
which critics denounced as "reckless and intemperate," was to "freeze the Senate," so
that members would hesitate before declaring quick support for the nominee. See
MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RISING: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST
THE BORK NOMINATION 34, 102 (1989).
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Now, these charges were all made against him, some of them in
the hearings, some of them on the steps of the Capitol, some of
them in television and newspaper argument. And what evidence
was there in support of any of them? .
Well, actually, not much.
The sterilization charge was based on his opinion for a unanimous
panel of the D.C. Circuit that an employer did not violate the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act by forcing women of childbearing
age to be sterilized or face transfer from a hazardous work area and,
possibly, dismissal. I4 Now, that is a cruel and perhaps misogynistic
policy. But I think it is safe to say that virtually no serious adminis-
trative law scholar thinks the opinion wrong, and many prominent
Bork opponents, including, for instance, Harvard law professor Lau-
rence Tribe, have said they thought his opinion was right. 15 In any
case, Bork was only telling us what he thought the Congress had
meant; the transmutation of that into a statement of his own prefer-
ences is difficult to fathom.
The charge that he was a defender of segregation was based on a
rather thoughtless little essay that he tossed off in The New Republic
while a relatively young scholar, explaining why, in his view, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 violated the property rights of the restaura-
teurs and innkeepers who would be forced to integrate their places
of business. Let us agree that what he proposed was badly wrong-
headed, even cruelly insensitive in its inversion of the relevant
rights. Congressional reliance upon his approach would have done
incalculable damage, Still, he wrote the article rather early in his
scholarly career, more than two decades, in fact, prior to his nomi-
nation. As a mature scholar, he subsequently repudiated it-albeit
not with quite the degree of contrition that many of us would have
preferred. Still, most of us have written silly essays as young schol-
ars, and some of us, supposedly mature, still do-occasionally even
in The New Republic.
The claim that he wanted the government in our bedrooms,
checking to see what form of contraceptives we might use, was
based on his perfectly sensible argument that Justice Douglas' opin-
ion to the contrary in Griswold v. Connecticut 16 was not convincing. I
do not say that I think Bork's critique was correct; I think Griswold a
better opinion than its many critics do. But to treat Bork's critique
14. Oil, Chern., and Alomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Cyanamid Co., 741
F.2d 444, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
15. ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA 179 (1989).
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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as outside the mainstream is ridiculous, and to go on to say that
because he does not believe that there is a constitutional right to
birth control he therefore must not believe in birth control is, shall
we say, disingenuous. True, it is possible to create constitutional
theories in which judges should be (or even cannot help but be)
guided solely by their policy preferences, but those theories have
little to do with the function of the judicial branch in a constitutional
democracy. Consequently, absent very strong evidence to the con-
trary, we should not assume that a statement of constitutional the-
ory is a policy preference.
Which leads us to abortion. It is true that Bork has heaped con-
tempt upon the opinion in Roe v. Wade.J7 But he is hardly alone in
having done so; indeed, the critics of Roe inc;lude scholars who are
pro-choice in their politics, as well as many others who can hardly be
dismissed as right-wing ideologues. So disagreeing with the Court's
reasoning-even doubting whether any rationale will support the
result-hardly makes one a dangerous radical.
Let me dispose of a second abortion bugaboo. A few years ago, a
pro-life scholar named Stephen Galebach proposed the enactment
of what he called the Human Life Bill, a federal statute that would
have defined conception as the point at whiCh human life begins and
thus overturned Roe. Galebach believed, for reasons I do not
trouble to detail here, that the statute 'was within the constitutional
power of the Congress. Few mainstream scholars agreed. 'Accord-
ing to Bork's opponents, he was one of the few. But this charge was
not a simple distortion-it was actually false: Botk had testified that
the Human Life Bill would be unconstitutional. 18
But I digress. My point is not to refight the Bork battle after all
these years, and reasonable minds certainly may differ over both the
significance and the relevance of all these different allegations. Still,
note what they have in common. Through their rhetorical elevation
from disagreements over legal doctrine to important character
flaws, they become tools for demonstrating that the nominee is mor-
ally venal, rather than simply that he would vote in ways that the
17. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
18. Bork's opponents would have done better to focus on the reason he offered for
unconstitutionality, rather than claiming that he was on the other side. He considered
the bill unconstitutional because it was to be enacted pursuant to the same
congressional authority that enabled the Voting Rights Act of 1965-an authority, said
Bork, that the Supreme Court had wrongly supposed, the Congress to possess. I
disagree with him on the Voting Rights Act, but that is not the point. The point is that if
one indeed cares about a nominee's votes in potential cases, this might have been a
stronger place to stand.
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critic dislikes. In effect, they represent the very essence of the
search for disqualifying factors.
If I believed the opposition to Bork was based on a perception
that he was closed-minded, I would have thought it both principled
and legitimate, however much I might have disagreed with the char-
acterization. I fear, however, that the case was based on a percep-
tion that he was closed-minded in the wrong direction-just as many of
his supporters believed him to be closed-minded in the right
direction.
Again, I have written elsewhere about why I worry that this partic-
ular disqualifying factor threatens judicial independence. The short
of the matter, for reasons that should be too obvious to need expli-
cation, is that we are better off with judges who make up their minds
after hearing arguments rather than before. Besides, the constitu-
ent groups that argue that this assertedly' "democratic" check on the
Court is necessary probably do not mean it. I suspect that they
would be terrified at the thought of actually allowing the democratic
processes, rather than Beltway insiders, to decide which judicial de-
cisions the nominee should "promise" to preserve, protect, de-
fend-or overturn-which helps explain why the nominee's
purported disqualifications are stated in such apocalyptic, headline-
grabbing terms.
III. THE CABINET: A SMALLER, LONGER HISTORY
As it turns out, not much has been written in law reviews about
the selection and confirmation of cabinet officers. One reason
might be that they are rejected so rarely. In fact, until the presi-
dency of Rutherford B. Hayes, it was quite rare for a cabinet nomi-
nee to be rejected by the Senate,_ mainly because-in line with the
Founders' conception-the nation spent its first ninety years with a
cabinet selected in part by the" Congress. The leading members of
Congress told the President whom to place in his cabinet, and, after
some negotiation, that was that. Presidents who fought the congres-
sional will found their nominees battered, as, for example, Andrew
Johnson's Treasury nominee, Roger Taney. President Hayes, not
satisfied with undoing Reconstruction, also had no patience with
congressional domination of the appointment process. He refused
to nominate the candidates pressed on him by powerful members of
Congress, and the Congress itself.-riven with internal turmoil as
the Reconstruction Era slipped, like magic, into the Gilded Age-
lacked the backbone to stand up to him.
In some respects, this was probably an improvement, because the
presidency of the first half of the nineteenth century was far too
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weak. But the growth of executive power between the Civil War and
World War II led to a situation that went too far in the other direc-
tion: congressional opposition to any presidential nominees, other
than to the judiciary, became rare. And from 1945 to the present
time, we have lived under a strange system in which it is customary
to allow the President to appoint what is usually called "his own
team," which, in effect, means that his nominees for cabinet posts
receive only very slight scrutiny. Indeed, prior to the withdrawal of
the Baird nomination, only four cabinet-level nominees (out of 230)
since World War II fail~d to gain Senate confirmation. Of these,
two were defeated and two withdrew. (If one includes as a cabinet-
level post the Director of Central Intelligence, there have been two
additional defeats or withdrawals.) Only one in nine nominations in
that period failed to receive the affirmative votes of at least ninety
percent of the Senators. 19
That does not mean, however, that the sledding for cabinet nomi-
nations has been easy. Indeed, precisely because it is so rare for
cabinet nominations to be defeated or withdrawn, some social scien-
tists have proposed testing the level of opposition rather than sim-
ply the rate ofapproval. Political scientists James D. King and James
W. Riddleperger, Jr. have demonstrated that the percentage of af-
firmative votes has been falling since fears of the imperial presi-
dency were aroused in the seventies, and the likelihood of Senate
rejection has grown. Consequently, there is reason to think that the
Baird brouhaha is less an aberration than a portent of things to
come.
IV. A WORD ABOUT "NANNYGATE" ... AND THE FORGOTTEN
CONSTITUTION
Before discussing how to deal with the future into which we may
be so recklessly stepping, it is useful to pause for a moment and
marvel at the peculiar fact that nobody, even in our rights-conscious
society, has seriously questioned the propriety of senatorial,jour-
nalistic, or other public inquiry into a nominee's child-care arrange-
ments. The centerpiece of our national outrage was the simple
conclusion that the potential Attorney General broke the law. It is
not as obvious as our opinion leaders made it appear, however, that
this fact alone is always disqualifying-or even, indeed, that it is nec-
essarily anybody's business.
19. See James D. King & James W. Riddlesperger, Jr., Senate Confirmation of
Appointments to the Cabinet and Executive Office of the President, 28 Soc. SCI. J. 189, 192-93
(1991).
HeinOnline -- 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 87 1993-1994
1993] CONFIRMATION MESS, CONTINUED 87
To understand the point, suppose a nominee who had broken a
very different law-one who had obtained an abortion at a time and
place where the practice was illegal or who had engaged in consen-
sual sexual activity with an adult of the same sex at a time and place
where such activity was illegal. It is difficult to believe that the
guardians of national morality-here I have in mind not only the
press and the pundits, but also the leaders of our various interest
groups-would have created such a stir. On the contrary, we would
presumably have been told that even to inquire into such matters
would be a violation of a fundamental right to privacy-and I think
that argument would be correct. Therefore, it is not the case that
every violation of law should lead to a moral judgment of unfitness
for office. In the examples mentioned, the privacy right of the nom-
inee would intervene.
Very well, what about what has come to be called the "nanny
problem"? The answer resides in separating the three most com-
mon "nanny problem" offenses, for they are not the same. One of-
fense is the failure to pay Social Security taxes on the sitter's wages.
Another is the failure to report the sitter's wages to the Internal
Revenue Service. A third is the knowing decision to hire an alien
who lacks proper documentation (or, what is also a legal violation,
the failure to determine prior to employment whether the nanny is
legally entitled to work).
Are any of these also covered by privacy rights? The answer de-
pends critically on one's view of the home and the life of the family.
In our traditional legal iconography, home and family life have been
deemed central to civil society. In his separate opinion in Poe v.
Ullman, Justice John Marshall Harlan-certainly no liberal activist-
argued that the Court should apply the strictest scrutiny when the
state seeks to regulate what goes on in the privacy of the home.20
He added that the Third and Fourth Amendments protect "the
physical curtilage of the home ... as a result of solicitude to protect
the privacies of life within."21 Because Justice Harlan was writing
about contraception, one might argue that the "privacies" in ques-
tion only involve the sexual relationship of husband and wife. But it
is difficult to imagine that our constitutional solicitude for choices
about childbearing is greater than our constitutional solicitude for
choices about childrearing. After all, the Supreme Court said in
Meyer v. Nebraska that among the most fundamental of constitutional
20. 367 U.S. 497,548 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
21. [d. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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rights are the rights "to marry, establish a home, and bring up
children.' '22
Once one accepts that the home is the rock on which society is
built, the nanny problem begins to lose the elegant simplicity that
helps sustain the outrage. Matters are much more complex. We
are, fortunately, well past the days when it was said that the king's
writ did not run into the home-which meant that husbands could
beat wives and children without official restraint-but the home is
still surrounded by a politic~l and philosophical mystique. Just as
fortunately, we are past the days when only one form of human ar-
rangement was described as the "family" on which the idea of home
critically rests. These positive changes make no essential difference
in the importance of home as a place free of a!l but the most vital
state intrusions. Thus, even today, the state should intervene rarely
and, when it does, it should do so only for the protection of some-
one else; never, in Kantian terms, to make people into means rather
than ends.
Some courts, recognizing the specialness of the home, have ruled
that the state lacks power to regulate the possession or use of other-
wise illegal drugs within those four walls. One need not share that
view to understand that the home, in our jurisprudence, remains
clothed in a specialness that other venues lack. Indeed, when the
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut sustained the right of mar-
ried couples to use contraceptives, Justice Douglas' majority opin-
ion concluded with a rhetorical question-and a firm answer:
"Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very
idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship."23 A few years later, when the Court upheld, in Stanley
v. Georgia, the right of individuals to possess obscene materials in
their homes, Justice' Thurgood Marshall wrote for the unanimous
Court: "[I]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that the
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch. "24
None of this is to say that a state decision to regulate parts of a
family's childrearing choices is unconstitutional. But when set
against the moral traditions of the nation, the state interests in en-
forcing the various laws at issue must at least be considered some-
what weaker. Thus, even if. the laws are constitutional, there are
moral and political questions to be resolved.
22. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added).
23. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
24. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
HeinOnline -- 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 89 1993-1994
1993] CONFIRMATION MESS, CONTINUED 89
Given this analysis, the safest answer is that only the first of the
three offenses-failure to pay the nanny's Social Security taxes-is
obviously the government's business. The reason is that the re-
quirement that the employer pay Social Security taxes is intended to
protect the employee; the fact that the employment takes place
within the four walls of the house and in the context of child care,
over which the parents have plenary authority, does not give the
parent-employer any right to take advantage of the employee. The
same would be true for minimum-wage or maximum-hour laws. In
other words, to protect employees from abuse, the sovereign's writ
runs into the home.25
But the other two requirements-that families report to the IRS
what their nannies earn and that they ascertain their nannies' immi-
gration status-would, in a sensible society, be beyond the govern-
ment's power, except perhaps for the most extreme cases. In
demanding that parent-employers check the nanny's work eligibility
or report the nanny's earnings, the government is not seeking to
protect against abuse of the employee; rather, the government is
seeking to protect against abuse by the employee. In other words,
the government is trying to 'ensure that the nanny does not escape
the tax or immigration laws. Enforcing those laws is of course the
government's business; but conscripting families, in the privacy of
their homes and the sanctity of their childrearing, into assisting in
that enforcement is not.26
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of chil-
dren's bedrooms for telltale signs of illegal employment? One
would hope not; here, one would like the home, and 'the choices a
family makes about childrearing, to be sacrosanct. It is no answer to
say that there is no physical search but only a reporting or payment
requirement, for even in Justice' Douglas's lyrical opinion in Gris-
wold, the search was only a metaphor for the intrusion itself.
25. Although the state may have a valid interest in enforcing its Social Security laws
for individuals who provide child care in the home, it is not clear that the state always
should do so. As the law now stands, the requirement is triggered whenever the worker-
say, the babysiuer-earns $50 in any quarter, The Social S~curity payroll tax is a
regressive transfer of income in the best of cases (lower-wage workers pay a higher
percentage of their income ,than higher-wage workers), but to require part-time
babysiuers who earn $50 in a single quarter to help support older individuals who have
already recovered all of their Social Security contributions, plus interest, is not simply
regressive. 1l is a cruel disincentive lO work, so cruel that it is hard to see why
disobedience at the employee s behest should be considered immoral.
26. Consequendy, our national compromise seems to have things. precisely upside
down. 1l has chosen to be forgiving, as far as the Senate will allow, for failures to pay
Social Security taxes, but seems adamant-as witness Kimba Wood's unfortunate
experienc~n the issue of the employment of illegal aliens.
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V. THE RISKS OF THE GAME
The public, of course, did not see matters that way-not, at least,
at the time. At the time, the wave of popular disapproval washed
over the Baird nomination so swiftly that even the vaunted news me-
dia seemed taken by surprise, and Washington politicians, strug-
gling to keep their heads above the roiling tide, told the President
that the nomination was dead. Indeed, for a brief moment of his-
tory-a moment, unfortunately, that trapped the eminently qualified
Judge Kimba Wood, who was thought to have the inside track as the
next nominee-we seemed to have defined a new moral issue for the
future. Illegal child care arrangements, it seemed during that mo-
ment, would prove even more of a barrier to public service than
membership in discriminating organizations-for when a nominee
belongs to a club that excludes black members, we allow a resigna-
tion to cure the problem.
But there is reason to think that the public, like the press and the
politicians, has backed off. At least one other cabinet official who
failed to pay Social Security taxes on a domestic employee has been
allowed to keep his seat, and this without a murmur of complaint. A
prominent lawyer who had similar difficulties and, according to
news reports, was therefore out of the running for a post requiring
Senate confirmation, l}as since been nominated for a high position
in the Justice Department. Once more, the press and the public
have been silent. Even the radio talk show hosts seem bored.
One way of explaining all of this-the best way, in my view-is
that we as a nation are admitting in our sheepish, indirect way that
we made a mistake in elevating Zoe Baird's admitted legal violations
in arranging child care to the level of national scandal. Perhaps
there was no scandal, only-how much more mundane!-two par-
ents who were trying to do what they thought best for their children.
By deciding that the violations are no longer as character-defining
as we briefly allowed ourselves to pretend, we may be showing our
own national maturity. Indeed, we may yet grow out of the instant-
opinion-survey business altogether, which would not be such a bad
thing.
The case of Kimba Wood showed, if anything, an over-sensitivity
to the opinion survey. The record should reflect that it is very hard
to find anything that she actually did wrong. True, she hired a
nanny who had no legal right to be in the country, but she did so at
a time when it was legal to do so. True, she told the President's
people that she lacked what is unfortunately known as a "Zoe Baird
problem," but that was the unvarnished truth, for Wood violated no
law. Of course, what the President's people had in mind was finding
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out whether Wood had anything that would be a public relations
problem. Once they learned of the status of her ex-nanny, they
seemed to decide that the public could not make the distinction.
Public opinion surveys made mock of the notion of a public too
foolish to tell the difference, as most of those questioned told poll-
sters that Wood, in their view, had done nothing wrong. But there
lies one of the fascinating problems with our strangely heavy reli-
ance on the instant survey. The President's people had to make up
their minds-and the President his-before any survey data was
available, and, indeed, before there was a Wood nomination (for
Kimba Wood, you will recall, was never actually nominated). Had
they waited, they might have learned something.
It is, however, very much in the nature of the search for the dis-
qualifying factor that we are impatient. When Anita Hill charged
that Clarence Thomas, while her supervisor at the EEOC, had sexu-
ally harassed her, most instant surveys showed that a majority of the
public believed Thomas, not Hill. In evident reliance on the
surveys, the Senate voted to confirm. Now, a year and a half later,
the surveys tell us that a majority of the public believes Hill, not
Thomas; in fact, a majority says that Thomas should not have been
confirmed.27 A lesson lurks there somewhere, but it is one too de-
pressing to ferret out. Perhaps the lesson has to do with deciding
whether elected representatives should vote our views or their own.
If Thomas was buoyed by instant surveys, another controversial
candidate, Robert Bork, was demolished by them. By the time his
hearings ended, the public had turned sharply against him. Nobody
actually believes today that Bork would have voted a harder right
line than Justices Antonin Scalia or Clarence Thomas-but it was
Bork whom the surveys did in.
In our democracy, the voice of the people obviously matters. But
it is an absurd notion that we promote democracy by paying close
attention to-perhaps even granting decisive weight to-instant
surveys based on the public's unconsidered judgments. Both in the-
ory and in practice, there is a distinction between democracy and
mob rule. Ifwe continue to miss that distinction, we will continue to
drive capable people away from public service-a considerable cost
with no corresponding benefit.
Now, I have heard it said that it does not matter if the process that
we have created scares away from public service some people who
27. Just as the existence of pro-Thomas surveys at the time is not strong evidence
that the Senate was correct in confirming him, the existence of more recem ami-Thomas
surveys is not strong evidence that the Senate was wrong.
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would be good. It does not matter if A is knocked off unfairly.
There is always somebody else-B-who will come forward with all
the same qualifications as A, and none of the shortcomings. Or so
the story goes.
But the somebody else who is out there and who, in theory, will
do such a great job, might be scared away too. Or, if not scared
away, that somebody else might sit for confirmation and be treated
just as shabbily. (One must remember the words of Sen~torJoseph
Biden, the Democratic chair of the Senate Judiciary Committe~,who
stated in the mid-1980s that he· wished President Reagan would
send up the name of a "principled" conservative like Robert Bork,
who would, quoth Biden, be confirmed with no trouble.) That is
why the idea that it is okay to lose outstanding public servants be-
cause there are so many out there is a little bit like the story of the
car dealer who sold ~very vehicle at a loss, figuring that he would
make it up on volume-a good way to go broke.
Similarly, choosing in our arbitrary, haphazard manner to dump
nominees over relatively minor sins is a sure route toward scaring
most good people away from public service. You cannot cure 'bad
decisions by saying that there. is a chance down the road to make
more.
VI. PLAYING BY THE PROPER RULES
This is not to say that no single factor should ever be taken to
disqualify anybody from any post. I argue only that we should not
presume that because we have found wrongdoing, we already have
the answer to the disqualification question.
I have proposed that we try harder to balance the wrong that an
individual might have done against the good service that he or she
might bring to the nation. The well-known weakness of baiancing
tests is that they rarely indicate the relative weights to be assigned to
the different factors that are balanced. In' the interest of trying to
alleviate that difficulty here, I will set forth a spectrum of potentially
disqualifying behaviors, ranging from those that should require the
most additional evidence before they can be cured to those that
should require the least.
First, I should 'say a word about what I am not discussing-that is,
disqualifying factors that are beyond the scope of this paper and,
indeed, beyond the reach of practical solutions. I exclude cabinet
nominees who are defeated or withdrawn because of explicitly
stated policy disagreements. Consideration of disputes of this kind
is entirely appropriate in casting a vote, and I only wish the Senate
would do it mote often. (As should be clear, I do not exclude judi-
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cial nominees on this ground.) I also exclude nominees who lose
out because they are caught in a crossfire between the President and
Congress over other, possibly unrelated, issues. Although I natu-
rally feel sorry for nominees who are shot down for reasons unre-
lated to their own qualifications-indeed, sometimes unrelated to
the departments they would serve-such losses as these are a conse-
quence of politics and therefore both unavoidable and, in a sense,
healthy. Finally, although I believe firmly in seeking diversity in ap-
pointments, I exclude from this discussion the possibility of re-
jecting candidat~s because they are of the wrong ra~e, sex, or
religion.28
But the plausible grounds for rejection that remain cover a vast
ground: For the sake of convenient understanding, I would propose
to divide potentially disqualifying factors into five categories. I do
not pretend that what I am doing is entirely new, or, perhaps, en-
tirely comprehensive. As will be seen, however, it is an important
aid to the analysis.
Category l-QJ.lalifications for the Job: My reference here is entirely
to the candidate's resume. Does the candidate have the basic ability
and relevant experience? How does the candidate compare with
others who have held the same position?
This is the single point that ought never be curable; that is, a
nominee who is patently unqualified for the job should never be
confirmed. Oddly, however, in the absence of ideological warfare or
simple racism, we seem unable to argue in these terms. Thus, for
example, Senate opponents of Thurgood Marshall, unembarrassed
about defending racial segregation, were not reluctant to claim that
he lacked the minimum qualifications for the job, even though, in
light of his resume (which included victories in twenty-nine of thirty-
two cases argued in the Supreme Court), the claim was patently
ridiculous.
Some nominees who were opposed on the basis of their lack of
qualifications were indeed ,unqualified. G. Harrold Carswell, nomi-
nated by President Nixon, fits that category, and the Senate swatted
him aside with almost casual ease. More often, however, the ques-
tion of qualifications, even for the Supreme Court, is treated as
something too insulting to mention. No one is ever not smart
enough, not experienced enough, not even-tempered enough, not
open-minded enough.29 As to the cabinet, we have so thoroughly
28. For a perhaps overheated discussion of the reasons for my concern, see STEPHEN
L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 29-45 (1991).
29. I remind the reader that I fear that the left and the right alike use the term
"closed-minded" as a synonym for "doesn't agree with me."
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bought the myth that the President is entitled to his team that we do
not give qualifications much thought. In the rare case in which it is
mentioned-for example, President Carter's failed nomination of
Theodore Sorensen as Director of Central Intelligence-it is almost
always a code for something else. In Sorensen's case, the real fear
was that because he was a self-described pacifist, he must be soft on
the Cold War.
Yet we might spare our nation much agony-and much official
incompetence-if we were to develop the simple courage to say to
the President from time to time, "No, you may not have this person
in your cabinet. It is not that your nominee is immoral. It is not
that we do not like your nominee's politics. It is not that we are
throwing our weight around. It is simply that your nominee lacks
what we consider the minimum qualifications to do the job."
Category 2-Respect of the Public: The view of the public matters be-
cause, in a democracy, it is the public's respect for our institutions
that must ultimately give them their authority. (The principal alter-
native-as practiced in much of the world-'is, of course, authority
at the point ofa gun.) Ifa significant segment of the public loses (or
never possesses) respect for the nominee, and if that lack of respect
is likely to rub off on the relevant institution itself, the nomination
should be withdrawn or-if the nominee insists on a vote-'defeated.
This is not a comment on the quality of the nominee, because, as
we have seen, the public is often wrong in its moral judgments and
is even sometimes ashamed of them later. Thus, for example, Zoe
Baird was probably right to withdraw as nominee for Attorney Gen-
eral because the public response, even if unfair, would have hin-
dered her ability to do her job. Similarly, many have argued that
Clarence Thomas should have withdrawn as a nominee for the
Supreme Court, even if he was telling the truth, because enough of
the public disbelieved him that his effectiveness as a Justice and,
perhaps, the legitimacy of the Court itself might be compromised.
Unlike the fundamental lack of qualifications, however, a loss of
public respect should, in rare cases, be considered curable. The
low-risk cure is for the President to spend scarce political capital
making a public case for the nominee. This, of course, Presidents
have been willing to do only infrequently, because they need their
energies for other battles.
The high-risk cure is to confirm the nominee because of a faith
that the nominee's performance will be so spectacular that the pub-
lic will quickly regain the faith that it has lost. Some of Clarence
Thomas' supporters, in explaining their affirmative votes in the face
of strong (although perhaps not majority) public opposition, made
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precisely this argument. Supporters of Edwin Meese, whose nomi-
nation for Attorney General ran into difficulties but who ultimately
was confirmed, also insisted that once he had the chance to serve,
the public criticism-seen as whipped up by a biased media-would
fall away.
The reason this cure is high risk is that it requires a difficult pre-
diction regarding future events. Too often, Senators who explain
their votes on this ground are probably more wishful than certain.
But our public institutions are at risk when the public has grave
doubts about the nominee, and wishfulness is no substitute for the
cold calculation that sometimes requires our politicians to realize
that getting their way will cause more harm than good.
Category 3-Immoral Conduct: Despite what I have said above about
disqualifying factors, I should make clear that I think personal mo-
rality does matter, and matters greatly, when one is deciding how to
staff the government. Even though I question whether we have al-
ways in the past correctly identified what should count as immoral, I
do not dispute the proposition that consideration of the candidate's
moral uprightness is a part of the task of both the President and the
Senate.
The way one might put the question is this: Has the candidate
acted, outside of his or her official capacity, in a way that does not
violate any laws and does not violate any professional norms but
that nevertheless displays moral obtuseness? The charge that Clar-
ence Thomas sexually harassed Anita Hill might fit into this cate-
gory. So might the matter of the offensive jokes told by Earl Butz,
who, shortly thereafter, was forced to resign as President Ford's
Secretary of Agriculture, and James Watt, also forced to step down
as President Reagan's Secretary of the Interior. To be sure, the
jokes in question were told while Butz and Watt were serving in of-
fice, but had similar material come to light during confirmation
hearings, the Senate would have acted properly in taking it into
account.
Immoral conduct should be curable in some cases; that is, it
should not be as difficult to cure as lack of qualification (which
should not be curable) and loss of public respect (which should
rarely be curable). We must be cautious, however, about what we
label a cure. For example, when nominees are members of all-white
clubs-that is, when they have made a lifelong habit of relaxing in
the company of people who, by choice, avoid people of color-we
allow them to cure this immorality by the expedient of resignation.
But the problem is the habit of mind that makes membership possi-
ble and comfortable, not the fact that the membership exists.
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Category 4-Unethical- Conduct: Has the candidate violated any
norms of the profession, or violated any ethical standard to which
we generally hold public officials? I here have in mind the existence
of actual standards, with precedents that enable them to be applied
in difficult cases. The easiest case to determine is one in which the
nominee has actually been adjudged by a competent authority to
have violated an ethical norm. This will be true only if the nominee
is a member of a self-regulating profession, such as law or medicine,
or if-in government service or private life-the nominee has been
employed by an institution that promulgates and enforces a code of
conduct.
Violations of ethical norms should be curable more frequently
than the deeply immoral conduct constituting Category 3, but they
are serious matters. Past ethical violations may give more informa-
tion than anything else about the likelihood of further ethical viola-
tions while in government service, a factor which goes to the ability
to do the job well.
Many nominees have been accused of ethical violations. Abe For-
tas was ,said to have violated professional norms by accepting a con-
sulting fee (which he later returned) while serving as a Justice of the
Supreme Court; as a result, his nomination as ChiefJustice stalled,
and he was finally forced to resign. Theodore Sorensen was accused
of converting secret government documents to his own use; his
nomination as Director of Central Intelligence was withdrawn. Ed-
win Meese, as I have mentioned, was accused of arranging govern-
ment jobs for individuals to whom he owed money, but his
nomination as Attorney General succeeded.
As one might imagine, history is replete with instances of ethical
improprieties by presidential appointees. For example, Samuel
Swartwout, chief customs inspector for .the Port of New York (a fed-
eral appointment) stole $1.2 million from 1829 to 1838, before flee-
ing to Eng1and.30 (We are talking here 'about early nineteenth-
century dollars.) Reverdy Johnson, Attorney General under Presi-
dent Zachary Taylor, ordered the payment of $235,000 to settle a
claim against the U.S. government-without revealing that he him-
self, in private practice, had received a fee of $95,000 to represent
the very claimant on the identical claim.31 Just before the Gold
Panic of 1869, which was caused by the federal government's deci-
sion to place millions of dollars worth of gold up for sale, the assis-
tant treasurer of the United States borrowed $1.5 million to
30. ROBERT N. ROBERTS, WHITE HOUSE ETHICS: THE HISTORY OF THE POLITICS OF
CONFLICT OF INTEREST REGULATION 8 (1988).
31. [d. a1 9-10.
HeinOnline -- 62 U. Cin. L. Rev. 97 1993-1994
1993] CONFIRMATION MESS,' CONTINUED 97
speculate in the gold market, and the President of the United States,
Ulysses S. Grant, wrote to his own sister and urged that her hus-
band-an associate of financier Jay Gould-get out of the market.32
I mention these instances for a reason: they illustrate the concept
of "honest graft" that dominated the second half of the nineteenth
century and is raised even today, albeit not under that name, by al-
most any President whose associates are accused of unethical activ-
ity. "Honest graft" was the name given to the use of one's
government service to benefit one's friends and clients. It was graft
because it was unseemly, but it was honest because it was not against
the law. ("Dishonest graft" encompassed bribery and the like.)
Nowadays, honest graft frequently is against the law, as it should be,
which leads to one of our principal confusions about the role of eth-
ics in government: when investigation (for example, by an in-
dependent counsel) determines that an office-holder has violated no
law, we treat that result as a vindication. We forget in our investiga-
tions of the already confirmed what we try hard to remember in our
investigations of the nominated: a wrong that is not illegal may yet
be unethical, and a wrong that is unethical, unless balanced by some
positive good, should serve as a bar to public service.
Category 5-Illegal Conduct: It might seem surprising that I have
(tentatively) placed this category last, but, as will become clear,
there are reasons for it. -Obviously, we'should be wary about staffing
the government with people who have broken the law. It is possible
to be Holmesian about the law and see it as putting the citizen to a
choice-obey the law or pay the penalty-which leads to an image of
societal indifference as to whether the law is actually broken as long
as the criminal is punished. But criminal laws are not tort laws; their
purpose is to deter crime, not to force the criminal- to internalize the
costs of his or her activities. Put otherwise, a law is a moral state-
m~nt and its violation often an immoral act.
Nevertheless, it would be an error to ban from government ser-
vice anyone who had ever broken any law, and violations of law
should often be cur;ible. A ticket for driving fifty-eight miles per
hour in a fifty-five ITlile-per-hour zone simply is nolin the same cate-
gory as a conviction for beating one's spouse. One must see viola-
tions as existing along two axes-the importance of the law itself
and the severity of the violation. In fact, we might need to plot the
problem in three dimensions,. because illegalities near the core of
the duties we expect the nominee to perform might be more serious
than illegalities in areas wholly divorced from those duties.
32. [d. at 14-15.
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Thus, in addition to asking whether the nominee has violated any
laws, we must determine whether the law involved is related to the
task for which the individual has been nominated, whether those vi-
olations are consequential or inconsequential, how those who vio-
late the laws in question are generally treated (which tells us
something about the depth and profundity of moral judgment that
the laws involve), and whether the nominee has made appropriate
amends for the illegality. What I have in mind is not, strictly speak-
ing, a balancing test-I am not proposing that each of these ques-
tions must receive a particular answer in order for a "no" vote to be
justified-but inquiries of this kind must be undertaken before we
can decide how much weight to give to the underlying violation of
law.
With this test, some violations would never be curable. Murder,
rape, armed robbery-conduct that might reasonably be described
as malum in se rather than malum prohibitum-would obviously fall into
this category. Adultery (illegal in many states) probably would not.
Illegal drug use might be somewhere in the middle. True, Douglas
Ginsburg, when nominated for the Supreme Court, was pilloried for
marijuana use many years before, and zero tolerance might after all
be the most sensible policy. But it blinks at reality to deny, given the
self-indulgence of the "baby-boom" generation, that our govern-
ment is likely chock-full of people who tried drugs as teens or even
as adults. In all likelihood, many of our public servants use drugs
now-a scary thought, but one that seems statistically correct.
Although legal violations surrounding her employment of a
nanny shot down Zoe Baird, it does not appear after all that this will
be taken to disqualify all future candidates. (I have already men-
tioned that there are other Clinton appointees with similar legal dif-
ficulties.) Perhaps the laws that Baird violated should not fall into
the category of automatic disqualifications; on the contrary, perhaps
they should be easily curable. In which case, our national silence on
the "nannygate" violations of other government officials might be
our way of admitting that we are ashamed of the way we acted the
first time around.
Summary: Lest we forget, categorizing the wrong that the candi-
date has done is not the end of the story. For my basic proposal is
that we should balance what good the candidate might do when
serving in the position against the evil that the putatively "disquali-
fying" factor represents. To summarize, then, there are five catego-
ries of potentially disqualifying facts, which 1 have listed in order of
the ease of cure:
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1 - Lack of qualifications . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Not curable
2 - Loss of public respect .. . . . . . . . . . .. Rarely curable
3 - Deeply immoral conduct. . . . . . . . . .. Sometimes curable
4 - Unethical conduct Often curable
5 - Illegal conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Frequently curable
Looking at recent nomination battles, then, one would say, for ex-
ample, that Zoe Baird was in Categories 2 and 5, Clarence Thomas
possibly in Category 3 and certainly in Category 2, and Edwin
Meese possibly in Category 4. Robert Bork, although his nomina-
tion was defeated, fell into only Category 2. Thurgood Marshall,
whose nomination was vehemently opposed by conservative activ-
ists, fell into none of these categories. Opponents of both men tried
to paint them as fitting into Category 3, and, in Marshall's case, Cat-
egory 1. That similarity might help explain why Marshall has been
quoted to the effect that he thought Bork was badly treated.
VII. CONCLUSION
I have argued that the search for disqualifying factors takes us
. down a dangerous road. I have further suggested that if we are to
play that game, we should do it right, which means struggling for
consistency and striving for a sense of balance. People, after all, are
complicated, and the wrongs that we do in our lives are only part of
our characters.
The American mind, someone has written, is literal, like the
minds of the illiterate tend to be. Americans are less ideological
than pragmatic, and, therefore, value the concrete over the ab-
stract-the plain meaning over the metaphor. That, perhaps, is why
we often show so little patience with wrongdoing by those who are
in public life: we are unable to get our minds around such abstrac-
tions as the concept of sin.
We think of sin as wrongdoing-the violation of some duty,
whether written down somewhere or not-which means that we re-
ject the concept of sin as something that is ever-present in all of us:
Because we reject that concept in our national dialogues over moral-
ity, we are unable to encompass in those dialogues the more com-
plex metaphorical possibilities of contrition, redemption, and
forgiveness. Although, as many readers will know, I did not believe
Clarence Thomas' denials of Anita Hill's charges and therefore did
not think he should have been confirmed, I would genuinely rather
live in a world in which a Thomas who found himself able to say,
"Yes, it happened, and I am terribly sorry, but it was a long time ago
in a difficult time and I am a different man" might have found an
audience willing to listen. Listening, even forgiving, does not entail
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reward. A world in which people might have listened would not
necessarily be one in which his contrition would have led to his con-
firmation. But the question before the Senate would then have
been, empirically, a prediction of future behavior-metaphorically,
a judgment on the sincerity of his contrition-rather than a need to
impose punishment for his past. .
We do have an alternative to the way that we have been doing
business lately. We try, perhaps for the first time in our history, to
treat public servic~ as a calling rather than a reward. Rather than
thinking of serVice on the Supreme Court or at the Justice Depart-
ment as a chance to add points to one's resume, we can treat it as an
opportunity to labor on behalf of one's country, to offer a fair return
for what the nation has given. The question, then, should not be
whether the nominee "deserves" the position, as though the job is a
quid pro quo for years of moral rectitude. The question should be
whether this person is capable of honorable service of which, in the
future, ,we will be glad.
Or we can go on as we have been. We can refuse to develop a
sense of balance and we can continue to provide incentives to lie
and conceal. We can say to those who are nominated to serve us
that the best strategy, if a<;cused of any wrongdoing, is to stonewall
if possible, to lie if necessary-for we will reward you if you allow us
to continue deluding ourselves, but we will never forgive you if you
force us to face our own very human capacity for sin.
